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This paper studies non-neutrality of monetary policy in a model where at
money is used by banks to meet liquidity demand and a government bond to col-
lateralize reserve borrowing. It nds that if some banks are liquidity constrained,
any monetary policy that alters the bond-to -at money ratio moves the interbank
rate and is non-neutral in the steady state. Moreover, the e¤ect for liquidity un-
constrained banks is the opposite of that for the maximally constrained. Lastly,
if the expansion of digital ways of payment eliminates depositor withdrawals, at
money will stop circulation and a bullion standard will probably return.
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How can a di¤erence in economic performance be made by someone moving a mouse
or printing a special type of paper, that is, the central banks nominal operations?
This fundamental question concerning monetary policy has been long fascinating the
economics profession and inspiring many important works. This paper discovers a
new mechanism: Monetary policy produces real e¤ects in the steady state by relaxing
or tightening the liquidity constraint of commercial banks. Moreover, the e¤ects for
di¤erent types of banks are di¤erent, even opposite. While most of the existing works
on the question focus on at moneys role as media of exchange, this paper shares with
recent studies by Bianchi and Bigio (2017), De Fiore et al (2018) and Piazzesi and
Schneider (2018) in ceding the central stage to at moneys role in banks liquidity
management, while having bank liability serve as media of exchange. Indeed, in a
modern economy, the major form of media of exchange for goods and services is not
at money, but bank liability, and at money is extensively used by banks to meet
their liquidity needs, that is, to meet the withdrawal demand of depositors and to settle
interbank liabilities. The importance of this role of at money is evidenced by the fact
that a substantial fraction of at money is typically held by banks.1 Moreover, this
paper also models the important role that government bonds play for banksliquidity
management. To meet liquidity needs, often banks have to borrow reserves that is,
at money and for this borrowing government bonds are often used as the collateral.
Indeed, banks typically hold a large position of government bonds,2 and the importance
of public debt as collateral for obtaining liquidity in general is well established in the
economics literature.3
The model economy lasts for an innite number of periods, populated by a contin-
1Take the Bank of England as an example. Between June 2016 and June 2017 (i.e. before the
crisis), according to Rule (2015), on its liability side, there are about as much of reserves and cash
ratio deposits as the Banks notes. The former is held by commercial banks only, which also hold a
substantial fraction of the latter. It is hence safe to say that more than half of the at money that the
Bank has created is held by commercial banks.
2Gennaioli et. al. (2018) document that on average 9% of their assets is government bonds.
3See Woodford (1990), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), and recently
Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas(2016). Some empirical evidence is provided by Grobéty (2018).
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uum of banks, entrepreneurs, and workers. Banks issue nominal demandable liability
(i.e. a promise to pay at money at demand). Entrepreneurs borrow it as a means of
payment for hiring workers. Workers then deposit it back to the banking system. Due
to this circulation of money, a bank sees a fraction of its liability deposited into another
bank, becoming an interbank liability owed to the latter.4 Banks face a liquidity risk:
At an interim stage of each period, they might encounter a substantial withdrawal de-
mand. To gather at money to meet the demand, a bank can demand settlement of
interbank liabilities owed to it. Liquidity demand is thus passed on along the interbank
liability links. Consequently, banks with a bigger fraction of liability outow need to
meet a larger liquidity demand. If a bank nds its at-money position inadequate to
meet the liquidity demand, it has to borrow reserves from other banks. We assume
that this borrowing is collateralized with a permanent government bond.5 As a result,
banks face a liquidity constraint: Their reserve-borrowing capacity is equal to the value
of their bond positions. Monetary policy is modelled as a change to the aggregate
nominal-asset portfolio composed of both at money and the bond.
These two nominal assets are a perfect substitute to one another for individual
banks: The bond can be swiftly converted into at money via collateralized borrowing;
and at money earns interest on the interbank reserves market as the bond earns divi-
dend, at the same rate in equilibrium. For individual banks, therefore, the composition
of their asset portfolios is not determined while the value is. However, the bond-to-
at money ratio of the aggregate portfolio determines the property of the steady state
because it determines the portfolios real value in the steady state. This point can be
easily understood in the scenario where the stead-state value of at money is invariant
with its quantity. Suppose the ratio rises because at moneys quantity falls. In this
4In reality, a substantial part of interbank liabilities formed during daily transactions are cancelled,
but certainly not all of them. The unsettled part will add to the liquidity burden of the originating
banks. This way of forming interbank liabilities is considered by Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000),
Parlour, Rajan and Walden (2017), and Piazzesi and Schneider (2018), among others.
5Certainly, unsecured borrowing also plays an important part for banksliquidity management, but
that does not deny the importance of secured interbank markets, which is evidenced by their sheer
sizes e.g. $10 trillion in the United States in August 2007 according to Heider and Hoerova (2009).
Moreover, De Fiore et al (2018) document that the former is declining, the latter growing, in the U.S.
over the past 15 years.
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scenario, such a fall leaves the real value of at money unchanged and causes the unit
real value of money to rise. As the bond pays a xed stream of nominal dividend,
its real value rises. Altogether, the aggregate real value of liquid assets rises with the
bond-to-at money ratio. Indeed, if this ratio is above a threshold, then liquid assets
abound and no banks face a binding liquidity constraint. In this Never-Binding Regime,
at money is neutral: A change in its quantity a¤ects nothing but the nominal price
(so long as the steady state remains in the regime), that is, the steady state is in the
aforementioned scenario.
If the bond-to-at money ratio is below the threshold, the liquidity constraint is
binding for banks with an outow fraction above a critical level because their liquidity
burdens are the heaviest. In this Binding Regime, any monetary policy that alters
the bond-to-at money ratio, such as open market operations, moves the interbank
interest rate in the steady state. This movement results from the synthesis of several
e¤ects but, ultimately, is driven by a chain of three links. First, if the bond-to-at
money ratio changes, as discussed above, so does the abundance, that is, the aggregate
real value, of liquid assets. Second, such a change alters the maximal tightness of the
binding liquidity constraint. Third, this alteration moves the reserve borrowing rate.
To see why, note that liquidity constrained banks derive two benets from holding at
money: It earns interest on the interbank reserve market; and it helps relax these banks
liquidity constraint, the benet of which is measured by the tightness of the constraint.
Hence, only banks facing the tightest constraint hold at money and the sum of the
two benets is equal to the marginal cost of holding it (due to the time preference) in
equilibrium. If the maximal tightness of the liquidity constraint moves in one direction,
the interbank interest rate must move in the opposite direction. Observe that in this
mechanism nominal rigidity plays no role, nor does incomplete information regarding
monetary shocks.
Furthermore, we nd that an expansionary policy, by reducing the reserve borrowing
rate, decreases the lending rates of liquidity unconstrained banks, but increases those
of the maximally constrained; a contractionary policy does the opposite. Intuition is
as follows. An expansionary policy reduces the reserve borrowing rate and thereby
diminishes the funding costs of all banks. This is the only e¤ect for liquidity uncon-
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strained banks, which accordingly decrease their lending rates. Maximally liquidity-
constrained banks, however, receive another, o¤setting, e¤ect: The reserve borrowing
rate is reduced exactly because the tightness of these banksliquidity constraint (i.e.
the maximal tightness) is increased. This increase induces them to raise the lending
rate in order to contract the lending size. This e¤ect dominates the funding-cost e¤ect.
Hence in net, their lending rates increase, and their lending scales decrease, with an
expansionary policy.
Lastly, we nd that the steady-state real value of money approaches nil if the prob-
ability of depositor withdrawals goes to zero. That is because in this economy the
ultimate use of at money is to meet the withdrawal demand; after all a bank demands
settlement of its interbank credit positions only when it needs the at money to meet
its own withdrawal demand. Otherwise, why should it want at money, which pays no
return, rather than the credit positions, which pay the interbank rate? Hence, if the
expansion of digital ways of payment puts an end to depositor withdrawals, then at
money is useless and hence worthless. It will then stop circulation. Banks will issue
real liabilities, such as a promise to pay gold. That is, a bullion standard will probably
return.
Literature
This paper joins the long theoretical discussion on the non-neutrality of monetary
policy. The role of at money as media of exchange is abstracted from in the New Key-
nesian literature, but is modelled in the Cash-In-Advance literature; see Walsh (2010)
for a survey of both strands of literature. These strands of literature, in order to have
the non-neutrality of at money, usually resort to an assumption of either nominal
rigidity (e.g. menu costs or delay in changing nominal portfolios); or incomplete infor-
mation on monetary shocks;6 or exogenous rules on banksholding of excess reserves.7
To none of these we resort. The media-of-exchange role of at money is endogenized
by the search-matching literature following the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989), using physical frictions of trading. This literature develops into the New Mon-
6See the seminal work of Lucas (1972). Angeletos and Lian (2016) provide a survey and Mao (2019)
a recent development.
7See among others Chen (2018) and Mishkin (2016).
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etarism, a survey of which is provided by Lagos et al (2017) and Rocheteau and Nosal
(2017).8 Within the New Monetarism, at money is typically neutral (though not super
neutral),9 but Williamson (2012) shows that a change in the composition of at money
and the bond can produce permanent real e¤ects.10 Altogether, all the three strands of
literature consider at moneys role as media of exchange, whereas we focus on its role
in banksliquidity management.11
Closer to this paper are the recent studies on the e¤ects or e¤ectiveness of monetary
policy that put banksliquidity management at the central stage; see Bianchi and Bigio
(2017), De Fiore et al (2018) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2018). In all the four papers
(including the present one), banks face a withdrawal shock and use interbank reserve
markets for liquidity management. Bianchi and Bigio (2017) and the present paper
share the interest in the non-neutrality of nominal operations and nd complementary
mechanisms for it. They underline the search friction on the interbank market and the
policy works by altering the trade-o¤ that banks face in allocating funding between
assets of di¤erent liquidity, while in the present paper the friction is the collateral
constraint on reserve borrowing and the policy works by altering the tightness of this
constraint. This liquidity constraint plays a key part in De Fiore et al (2018) as well.
They also consider a leverage constraint as well as unsecured borrowing, which we do
not. Indeed, they underline that in di¤erent quarters of the parameter space di¤erent
constraints bind and discerning the binding ones is important for the policy decision
of the central bank. Di¤erent to the present paper, theirs features no nominal side
or interbank liabilities, nor are they interested in policy non-neutrality. Piazzesi and
Schneider (2018) underline the importance of the institutional features of the payment
8See Lahcen (2019) for a recent development that combines the labour search model of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) with the classic New Monetarist model of Lagos and Wright (2005).
9Observe that in certain money-search models, such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Cavalcanti
et. al. (1999), a change in the fraction of population that holds a unit of at money a¤ects the real
allocation. However, this e¤ect is, to a large extent, driven by the assumption that each agent holds
at most one unit of at money.
10In the seminal work of Wallace (1981) it is irrelevant.
11The problem of banksreserve holding is also considered by studies unrelated to the non-neutrality
of monetary policy, e.g. Cavalcanti et. al. (1999) and Ennis (2018). This problem is abstracted from
in studies that resort to a binding liquidity constraint for pinning down bankslending size; see e.g.
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007).
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system for the interplay between security prices, ination, and policy transmission. In
their work, the key friction is the leverage cost, which varies with the collateral ratio.
Besides, di¤erent to the other three studies, we model the ex ante bank heterogeneity
in the outow fraction and derive that monetary policy produces heterogeneous, even
opposite, e¤ects for banks with di¤erent outow fractions in the steady state.
This paper is built on a general equilibrium analysis of money creation by banks.
Analysis of this kind is also to be found in a recent strand of literature; see, among oth-
ers, Jakab and Kumhof (2015), Kumhof and Wang (2018), Mendizábal (forthcoming)
and Morrison and Wang (2018).12. Jakab and Kumhof (2015) examine the quantitative
implications of the fact that bank liability circulates as money. Kumhof and Wang
(2018) consider the implications of this fact in a New Keynesian model where ination
determinacy is obtained by using menu costs, Morrison and Wang (2018) its implica-
tions for banksliquidity management. And Mendizábal (forthcoming) examines the
implication of 100% reserve bank for bank lending. These studies have enriched our
understanding of banksmoney creation activity. Unlike the present paper, however,
none of these studies is concerned with the non-neutrality of monetary policy.
2 Model
The time t 2 T = f0; 1; 2:::g : There is a continuum [0; 1] of banks. Bank i 2 [0; 1]
is specialized to lend to sector i which consists of a continuum [0; 1] of entrepreneurs.
There are more workers than can be hired by entrepreneurs. All economic agents are
risk-neutral. Bankers live forever, with a discount factor of  < 1: Entrepreneurs and
workers live for one period. Hence, new members of them enter and exit each period.
Entrepreneurs enter with an endowment of  units of human capital, workers with one
unit of labour. If an entrepreneur hires l workers, then he produces Y = A1 l
units of the consumption good, corn, within the period, where 0 <  < 1: Corn is
perishable.13 We normalize  = 1: Workers not hired by entrepreneurs each produce w
12See also Donaldson et al (2018) and Wang (2019) in which banks issue real liability i.e. promises
to pay real goods rather than nominal liability.
13Even if it is storable, it will not be saved over periods in the steady state, due to the discount
factor  < 1.
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units of corn in autarky within the period.
In terms of assets, the economy has H units of at money and B units of permanent
government bond. Fiat money is to be used by banks to meet both depositor withdrawal
and to settle interbank liabilities, hence representing both cash and bank reserves in
reality. The government bond is to be used by banks as the collateral for borrowing at
money (i.e. reserves), hence representing all the liquid assets of this use. The specic
payment structure of the bond does not matter; we choose to model it as a Lucas tree.
Each unit of the bond pays out d units of money as the dividend at the end of each




denote the ratio of the bond to at money held by the private sectors. This bond-to-at
money ratio characterizes the aggregate nominal asset portfolio:
A := (H;B) = H  (1; ) :
We will model a monetary policy as a change to A: Entrepreneurs and workers are
endowed with neither of the assets when they enter and will carry neither when they
exit. Therefore, all assets are held by banks.
Workers and entrepreneurs own all the factors of production and form the real side
of the economy. What makes banks matter for the resource allocation is the following
friction of payment.
Assumption 1: Workers do not accept entrepreneurspromise to pay as a means
of wage payment, but they accept money, which is either at money or bankspromise
to pay at money.
The assumption captures the real-life observation that banksliabilities are widely
accepted as a means of payment, whereas rarely so are non-bank rms or natural
persons.14 To hire workers, therefore, entrepreneurs need to borrow either at money
or some banksliabilities. Because no banks default on their liabilities in the model,
these two forms of money are equivalent for entrepreneurs and workers: One unit of at
14Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) provides a foundation for this assumption, as is explained in detail by
Wang (2019), who has made a similar assumption.
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money is worth the same as one unit of bank liability, dened as a promise to pay one
unit of at money. For the time being, we assume that banks keep at money and lend
only their liabilities to entrepreneurs; later, we will show this is an optimal decision.15
We assume that entrepreneurs of sector i 2 [0; 1] can borrow only from bank i which
is specialized to lend to the sector.16 As a result, banks have monopolistic power over
their borrower entrepreneurs. Later, we will introduce bank heterogeneity. Due to the
monopolistic power, all banks will stay in businesses and their lending rates are a mark
up of their lending costs, which, we will show, are a¤ected by monetary policy.
Entrepreneurs use borrowed bank liabilities to hire workers and workers might de-
posit their wage incomes with other banks than their employers. As a result, a fraction
of money lent by one bank ows out into others. This outow fraction, denoted by x;
denes the banks permanent type. In reality, myriads of transactions can cause one
banks deposits to circulate into another, as Bianchi and Bigio (2017) underline, and
the outow fraction is an attribute of banks. For example, it is bigger for banks sparsely
branched than for those extensively branched because the more extensive are a banks
branches, the more likely is the money lent out by it circulating back to itself. In the
model economy, the outow fraction is the only source of bank heterogeneity. This
heterogeneity is important: The e¤ect of monetary policy can be opposite for banks of
di¤erent outow fractions, as we will show. In aggregation, the cumulative distribution
function of x across banks over [0; 1] is F () : Given that the identities of banks are less
important than their types, we describe a representative type x bank in what follows.
Suppose at period t; a type x bank lends outMxt units of liability. Then xMxt units
of it are deposited with other banks. When one unit of one banks liability is deposited
with another bank, what the receiving bank does is as follows. It adds one unit of credit
to the depositors account on the liability side. On the asset side, given that it now
holds the originating banks promise to pay one unit of at money, the former holds a
credit position of this value to the latter. To simplify the exposition, we assume that
15In reality, indeed, what banks lend to the real economy is typically their liabilities.
16A justication for this assumption is that banks need to screen borrowers before making lending,
and the cost of screening is much lower if the borrower is from within the specialized sector than
from without. Bank specialization has been well documented in empirical research: see among others
Jonghe et. al. (2016), Liu and Pogach (2016), Ongena and Yu (2017), and Paravisini et. al. (2014).
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the liability of any bank ows out to all the other banks evenly. As a result, to each




xMxtdF (x) : (1)
Let t denote the interest rate of interbank liabilities, qt the nominal price of the bond
after the dividend payment and Rxt the gross lending rate charged by the type x bank.





To depositors of its own liability
((1 x)Mxt)
Credit to other banks
(It(1+t))
whose liabilities are deposited To depositors of other banks
(It)
liabilities
Fiat money (hxt) To other banks that hold its liability
(xMxt(1+t))
The bond ((qt + d) bxt) Equity
Table 1: The balance sheet of the type x bank after lending and depositing
It follows that the quantity of the type x banks deposits at period t is
Dxt = It + (1  x)Mxt: (2)
and its net interbank credit position is
xt = It   xMxt: (3)





MxtdF (x) (4)Z 1
0
xtdF (x) = 0: (5)
Namely, the aggregate of deposits equals the aggregate of loans, because all the money
deposited into the banking system comes from banks lending in the rst place; and
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the aggregate net interbank position is zero because one banks credit position is the
counterpartys liability.
In reality, the major form of banksliabilities that are widely accepted as a means of
payment is demand deposits. We assume that in the model economy, the bank liability
that workers accept as a means of wage payment takes this form, bearing the right to
withdraw on demand. This exposes banks to liquidity risk. To model this liquidity
risk, we assume at the middle stage of each period t, e! fraction of a banks depositors
demand to withdraw their claims. Ex ante at the beginning of the period, e! = !
with probability  > 0 and e! = 0 with probability 1    > 0; and its realisation is
independent across banks and over time. To obtain at money to meet the withdrawal
demand, a bank can demand settlement of interbank liabilities owed to it. Therefore,
the liquidity demand can be passed on along the interbank liability links. If a bank
fails to meet all the withdrawal and settlement demand, it is in a liquidity crisis. We
assume this crisis is very costly so that it is avoided in equilibrium. At period t; the
withdrawal demand of the type x bank is e!Dxt; the bank has hxt units of at money,
and its net interbank credit position is xt. Contingent on the realization of e!; the
banks net reserve position t is hence
t (e!; x) = hxt +xt   e!Dxt: (6)
With equations (2) and (3),
t (e!; x) = (hxt + (1  e!)It)  [e! (1  x) + x]Mxt: (7)
Here term e! (1  x)+x represents the quantity of liquidity that the type x bank needs
to service the lending of one unit of liability. First, x fraction of the unit of liability ows
to other banks and becomes an interbank liability, to settle which the bank needs x unit
of at money. Second, of the rest 1  x unit, e! fraction is in demand to be withdrawn.
To meet this demand the bank needs e! (1  x) unit of at money. Altogether, the
marginal liquidity burden to service the banks lending is e! (1  x) + x. Let !e := !
denote the average probability of withdrawal. Then
x : = ! (1  x) + x
 ex : = !e (1  x) + x
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are respectively the maximum and average marginal liquidity burden of the type x
bank.
We previously assumed that banks lend out their liabilities rather than at money.
Now it is time to explain that is the optimal decision of banks. If a bank lends out at
money (instead of its liability), then one unit of at money services only one unit of
loan. By contrast, if the bank lends out its liability instead of at money, then one unit
of at money services 1=x > 1 units of loans. Hence, it is in banksinterest to lend
out their liabilities rather than at money, as we observe in practice.
If the net reserve position t (e!; x) < 0; the bank needs the capacity to borrow  t
units of at money to cover the liquidity shortfall. We assume that borrowing of reserves
must be collateralized with the government bond. The interest rate of borrowing at
money is equal to that of interbank liabilities, t; because the former can be used to
settle the latter. Given the bond position bxt of the bank, its borrowing capacity the
maximum quantity of at money that it can borrow is (qt + d) bxt= (1 + t) : Therefore,
the following liquidity constraint is to be honoured:
 t (e!; x)  qt + d
1 + t
bxt:
This constraint is tighter if the bank encounters the liquidity shock and e! = !. With








+ (1  !)It: (8)
On its left hand side is the quantity of liquidity that the bank needs in order to service




bxt := Vt (x) (9)
is the quantity of liquidity that the bank can obtain with its asset holding (hxt; bxt),
or the banks liquidity position Vt (x). Second, (1  !)It is the part of the interbank
credit that the bank can use to meet its liquidity need because out of It units of
other banksliabilities owing into this bank, ! fraction is withdrawn. Altogether, the
liquidity constraint (8) says that banks meet their liquidity demand either with their
liquid assets or their interbank credit positions.
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Towards the end of each period t, entrepreneurs produce corn and sell it for money
bank liability or at money. Among the buyers of corn rst are the workers employed
by entrepreneurs, who hold either bank liability as their wage payment, or at money if
they have withdrawn their deposits. They spend all their money buying corn because
they will exit in this period. Second, banks also issue new liability and use it to buy corn
from entrepreneurs. Indeed, that must occur in equilibrium. Otherwise, there will not










RxtMxtdF (x) ; where the inequality
is because loans all command a gross return rate Rxt > 1; that is, the supply of money
is smaller than the demand and the market is not clear, untrue in equilibrium. Let pt
be the market-clearing price of corn, that is, 1=pt is the real unit value of money.
After selling corn, entrepreneurs use the money from the sales revenue to repay loans
to the banks and pay the lump sum tax to the government, which then distributes the
tax revenue as the dividend to bondholders. Observe that entrepreneurs might have ex-
changed corn with money that is the liabilities of other banks than their lenders. Hence,
after the repayment of loans and the distribution of the bond dividend, some banks
liabilities might ow to others another round. These newly formed interbank liabilities,
and those formed at the beginning of the period (due to depositing), altogether are
then netted and settled with at money. Afterwards, the market opens where banks
trade the bond with at money at price qt; accordingly choosing their asset positions
(ht+1; bt+1) for the next period. We assume that if a bank fails to settle its interbank
liabilities, it will be out of business forever. As a result, no banks issue new liability for
the purchase of corn in such a scale that they will default.17
Lastly, the economic agents consume the corn that they have obtained; for banks,
this consumption means dividend to their shareholders. Then, workers and entrepre-
neurs of this period exit and the next period dawns on banks.
The timing of events at period t can be illustrated as follows.
17Monnet and Sanches (2015) provide an analysis of how the market discipline stops banks from
over-issuance if the cost is endogenous.
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Figure 1: The timing of events in period t: At the beginning banks lend demandable
nominal liability to entrepreneurs who use it to hire workers. At the middle stage, the
liquidity shocks realise and the interbank reserve market opens. At the end of the
period, the interbank liabilities are cleared and banks choose asset positions for the
next period.
Two technical conditions are assumed. First,




















1  ! < E (x) 
1
1  ; (13)
both of which command the size of the liquidity shock ! is not too big.
Passing on to the analysis of the market equilibrium, we examine the social planners
allocation as a benchmark, which concerns the number l of workers that each entrepre-
neur employs. Considering that the opportunity cost of a worker in this employment is
18This assumption is satised in the macroeconomics literature where the labour share  is around
2=3 and the discount factor  around 0:9.
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We begin with entrepreneursproblem, then banksproblem, and lastly the clearing of
three markets: The interbank reserve market at the interim stage, and the corn market
and the bond market towards the end of each period. Given that we are interested in
the non-neutrality of monetary policy in the steady state, we consider the steady state
only. The steady state of a variable zt is denoted by z; e.g. the steady-state nominal
price is p. Moreover, for a nominal variable z; its real counterparty is denoted by ez;
that is, ez := z=p:
3.1 Entrepreneursdecision
In each period, given that there are more workers than can be employed by entrepre-
neurs, workers earn an equilibrium real wage that is equal to their output in autarky,
w. The nominal wage is hence wp: If an entrepreneur borrows M units of money, then












 MR  the lump-sum tax

:
The nominal demand function of money is hence







whereby the real demand function is






The number of workers employed by the entrepreneur is fM=w and thus equal to:
l = lSB R 
1
1  : (17)
Therefore, the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocation depends only on bankslending
rates R.
3.2 Banksdecision
In the steady state, a type x bank enters period t with portfolio (hx; bx) : During the
period, the bank earns three incomes. First, if it charges lending rateR; then it lends out
M (R) units of money and thereby earns a prot of M (R) (R  1) : Second, contingent
on the realisation of e!; it has a reserve position  (e!; x) given by (7), which earns it
interest  (e!; x)  on the interbank reserve market. Third, it earns dividend dbx from
its bond position. The incomes are spent either paying dividend t or adjusting its
asset position. The banks nominal budget constraint is thus,
t + [ht+1 + qbt+1   (hx + qbx)] =M (R) (R  1) +  (e!; x) + dbx: (18)
Hence, the banks problem is:




+ V (ht+1; bt+1) ; (19)
subject to (18) and the liquidity constraint (8), or its real version:
xfM  ehx + q + d
1 + 
ebx+ (1  !) eI : (20)
In the steady state, type x chooses (ht+1; bt+1) = (hx; bx) : We rst nd the optimal
lending rate R of the bank and then its optimal portfolio choice (hx; bx) :
Let  (x) be the Lagrangian multiplier for the liquidity constraint (20). Then  (x)
measures the marginal benet of at money to the bank by relaxing its liquidity con-
straint and the marginal cost of an increase in its liquidity burden by tightening the
constraint. The optimal lending rate is given by the following lemma.




 (1 +  ex +  (x) x) := R (x;  (x) ; ) : (21)
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Of this formula, the term 1= is the mark-up factor due to the monopolistic power
that the bank has over its borrower entrepreneurs, and
C = 1 +  ex +  (x) x (22)
is the marginal cost of lending. To understand why so, rst, what the bank lends out is
its liability. Hence one unit of loans entails one unit of liability that the bank is obliged
to repay, which costs 1. Second, each unit of loan issued by the type x bank needs  ex
unit of liquidity on average to service and the cost of liquidity is  per unit. Hence the
liquidity cost per unit of loan is  ex: Lastly, under the liquidity shock, one more unit
of loan increases the liquidity burden by x unit and thereby incurs a cost of  (x) x:
Altogether, equation (22) obtains.
Consider now the type x banks portfolio choice (hx; bx) in the steady state. To
begin with, for individual banks, the bond is as liquid as at money: The former can
be fully converted into the latter via collateralized borrowing on the interbank reserves
market. Therefore, these two assets should deliver an inter-temporal return at the same
rate.
Proposition 1 The net return rate of holding the bond over a period is equal to that




As a result of this proposition, the bond is a perfect substitute for at money to
individual banks. Hence, the composition of the type x banks portfolio is indetermi-
nate; what is determined is its market value, hx + qbx: This market value is equal to
the quantity Vx of liquidity that can be obtained with this portfolio: By equation (23),
hx + qbx = hx +
q + d
1 + 
bx = V (x) :
This equation holds because the bond is as liquid as at money in the model economy.
Banks hold these assets for liquidity reasons. In the steady state, the marginal
cost of holding a unit of liquid assets, such as at money, is 1=   1 due to the time
preference, while the marginal benet is twofold. First, liquid assets earn a return at
rate  in the next period, as said by Proposition 1. The other, it relaxes the liquidity
17
constraint, of which the marginal benet is  (x) to the type x: Together, therefore, the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions regarding the asset holding are
+  (x)  1

  1; (24)









and that V (x) > 0 only if  (x) = : That is, only banks that face the tightest liquidity
constraint hold liquid assets and the total marginal benet of doing so  +  is equal
to the marginal cost (1  ) =: This simple observation actually bears a surprising
implication.
Proposition 2 The lending rates of liquidity-unconstrained banks increase with the
interbank interest rate ; but those of the maximally constrained decrease with it.
Proof. If a bank is liquidity unconstrained, then  = 0: By (22) the banks lending









   into (22), the banks lending cost C = 1 + 1 

x    (x    ex) : This
cost strictly decreases with  hence so does its lending rate  because x    ex =
(1  )! (1  x) > 0.
If the interbank rate  rises, banks funding costs rise, and hence their lending
rates should rise as well  so it is widely believed. This is indeed true for liquidity
unconstrained banks. For banks maximally constrained, however, the opposite is true,
by the proposition. Intuition is suggested by the proof. A rise in the cost  of liquidity
indeed increases any type x banks funding cost at a rate of  ex because each unit of loan
needs average  ex unit of liquidity to service. Besides this e¤ect, however, for a type
x that is maximally liquidity constrained, a rise in  is associated with an additional,
countervailing, e¤ect. Because  = (1  ) =   ; a rise in  must be companied with
a fall in the tightness  of this types liquidity constraint. This fall reduces the lending
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cost at a rate of x by equation (22) because it is concerned with the liquidity burden
in the contingency when the shock has happened. This rate is greater than the rising
rate  ex of the funding cost because the latter is due to the average liquidity burden.
Hence, in net, the lending costs and thus the lending rates as well of the maximally
liquidity-constrained banks actually decrease with the interbank rate .
Proposition 2 highlights the importance of the tightness of a banks liquidity con-
straint. This tightness  depends on the banks liquidity burden, the right-hand side
of the liquidity constraint (20). Given the real demand function fM (R) in (15) and
the lending rate in (21), the type x banks real liquidity burden is represented by the
following function.
eS (x; ; ) := xfM (R (x; ; )) = x A2




It has the following properties.
Lemma 2 @ eS
@x
> 0, @ eS
@
< 0 and @ eS
@
< 0:
That @ eS=@x > 0 is driven by the fact that a unit of owing-out liability becomes an
interbank liability and thus needs 1 unit of liquidity to service, whereas a unit of liability
deposited back needs ! unit of liquidity to service under the liquidity shock; thus the
outow of liability increases the banks liquidity burden. If the liquidity constraint is
tighter i.e.  rises or the interbank rate  is higher, then the marginal cost of lending
is higher; consequently, the bank increases the lending rate R, which lowers its lending
size M and thus reduces its liquidity burden S.
That @ eS=@x > 0 suggests that the tightness  (x) of the liquidity constraint in-
creases with the outow fraction x: That is indeed true. The liquidity constraint (20)




; eI := minnxjeS (x; 0; )  (1  !) eIo ; (28)
then, for x < xL; we have eS (x; 0; ) < (1  !) eI : That is, the liquidity constraint (27)
is non-binding even if eV (x) = 0 and the bank holds no liquid assets. Hence  (x) = 0 for
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x < xL: Second, a bank holds liquid assets, we have seen, only if  =  = (1  ) = :
Hence, a type x bank needs liquid assets to meet the liquidity constraint (27) if and
only if eS  x; ;  > (1  !) eI ; which is equivalent to x > xH ; where
xH

; eI := minnxjeS (x; (1  ) =   ; )  (1  !) eIo : (29)
That is, if and only if x > xH ; the bank holds liquid assets and  (x) = : If  > 0; the
liquidity constraint (27) is binding, which determines the asset holding:
eV (x) = eS (x; (1  ) =   ; )  (1  !) eI : (30)
These two thresholds are ordered as follows.
Lemma 3 xH  xL > 0 and the rst inequality holds in the strict form if  > 0:




; on the one hand, x < xH and
hence the bank holds no liquid assets, i.e. eV (x) = 0. On the other hand, x > xL and
hence the liquidity constraint is not non-binding with eV (x) = 0: Together, eV (x) = 0
and the liquidity constraint (27) is binding, which leads to
eS (x; ; ) = (1  !) eI : (31)





 = 0 if and only if  = (1  ) =: The discussion leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (a) If  = 1 

and hence the maximal tightness  = 0; then  (x) = 0
for all x and eV (x) is indeterminate so long as it satises the liquidity constraint (27):
eV (x)  max0; eS x; 0; 1  


  (1  !) eI :
(b) If  < 1 

and hence  = 1 

   > 0; then  (x) = 0 for x  xL;  (x) is




; and lastly  =  for x  xH :
Moreover,




According to this proposition, while V (x) is indeterminate if  = (1 )=, the tight-
ness (x) of the liquidity constraint is a function of (; eI), and can therefore be written
as 

x; ; eI. Then the real lending scale of a type x bank is fM Rx; x; ; eI ; .
By equation (1), the aggregate interbank liability inow eI to each bank satises:
eI = Z 1
0
xfM Rx; x; ; eI ;  dF (x) := T eI ;  (33)
That is, eI is a xed point of T (; ). The function T denotes the aggregate of interbank
liability outow if banks have eI units of the interbank credit to lean on for their
liquidity needs, given the interbank rate . In equilibrium, the aggregate interbank
outow equals the aggregate inow and T = eI . If eI is very small, that is, if eI 
S(0; ; ), even type x = 0 need hold liquid assets to meet the liquidity demand, and
thus  =  = (1 )=  for all x and T
eI ;  = ExfxfM(R(x; ; ))g. If eI is very
large, that is if eI  S(1; 0; ), even type x = 1 can meet its liquidity demand wholly
with the interbank credit and need hold no liquid assets, and thus  = 0 for all x and
T (eI ; ) = ExfxfM(R(x; 0; ))g. In between, 0eI  0 because the more abundant the
interbank credit, the looser the liquidity constraint. As a result, T 0eI  0. Therefore,
for any  2 [0; (1  )=] ; the xed point problem of (33) has a solution, denoted byeI(), as illustrated in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: The equilibrium interbank credit eI is the xed point of function
T (; ).
In particular, at  = (1   )=,  = 0 for all

x; eI and T (; ) is a constant.










Having examined banksdecision and found eI = eI(), we move on to consider
the clearing of markets and dene the steady-state equilibrium.
3.3 Market clearing and equilibrium denition
In each period three markets open in the model economy: The interbank reserve market
at the interim stage, and the corn and the liquid-asset markets at the end of the period.
To pin down the equilibrium, we choose to consider the clearing of the rst and third
of these three markets, beginning with the latter. As was said, the composition of the
liquid assets held by individual banks is indeterminate and what is determined is their
value. The real value of the liquid assets demanded by a type x bank is eV (x), given
by Proposition 3. The aggregate demand is hence
Z 1
0
eV (x)dF (x). The aggregate real
supply the real value of the aggregate liquid-asset portfolio is eH+q eB = eH(1+d=)
because q = d= (by equation 23) and B = H. The clearing of the liquid-asset market
commands Z 1
0





Regarding the interbank reserve market, one banks interbank interest income must
be anothers expense. That is, Ee!;xf(!; x)g = 0. By (23),  = d=q > 0. Hence,
Ee!;x f(e!; x)g = 0.




fM Rx; x; ; eI () ;  dF (x) = eH: (35)
As eH = H=p, Equation (35) pins down the price level p in the steady state. In
the model economy, the means of payment is served by banks liabilities. The eco-
nomic function of at money is to meet banks liquidity demand, which is equal to
the aggregate of depositor withdrawals because the interbank claims are netted out in
aggregation. Hence Equation (35).
Use equation (35) to cancel eH in equation (34) and we arrive at a single equilibrium
condition:Z 1
0







fM Rx; x; ; eI () ;  dF (x): (36)
We can dene the steady-state equilibrium in real terms as follows.
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(I): Given the interbank interest rate  and thus the interbank credit eI = eI();eV (x) is the optimal asset holding by type x banks, as given by Proposition 3.
(II) Given banksasset holdings
neV (x)o
x2[0;1]
; the interbank interest rate  satises
condition (36).
It follows from Equation (35) that





fM Rx; x; ; eI () ;  dF (x): (37)
Obviously, the aggregate real lending
Z 1
0
fM Rx; x; ; eI () ;  dF (x) can never
go to innity.19 The following proposition regarding the real unit value of money p 1
is hence self-evident.
Proposition 4 lim!e!0 p 1 = 0 and @p 1=@!e > 0 at !e % 0. That is, at money
is worthless in the steady state if there is no random withdrawal; and the steady-state
price level p rises if the average withdrawal probability !e is very small and falling.
The proposition is intuitive. In this economy, the ultimate use of at money is
to meet depositorsdemand for withdrawals. As a result, the higher the withdrawal
demand, the greater the economic value of at money. In the extreme case where
depositors never randomly withdraw (i.e. !e = 0), at money is useless and thus
worthless. In this case, at money will not circulate, nor will the nominal liabilities of
banks, and they will have to issue real liabilities, that is, a promise to pay real goods,
probably bullion. Due to the decades of advancement of digital ways of payment,
nowadays the probability of random withdrawals  namely withdrawals for reasons
other than concerns about the banksdefault risks is indeed very small and getting
even smaller. This paper hence predicts that the continuing advancement of digital ways
of payment, by reducing the withdrawal probability, will raise the nominal price level;
19Indeed by (21), the lending rates R > 1=, and hence the real lending scales fM < A2w  11  by
(16).
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and if it completely eliminates random withdrawals, at money will stop circulation
and a gold or silver standard will probably return.
We move on to examine the other properties of the steady state in the next section,
focusing on the real e¤ects of monetary policy in the steady state. We dene the central
bank of the economy a unique entity that can produce or retire at money costlessly
and manages a large stock of the government bond. Then monetary policy is modelled
as a change  := (H ;B) to the aggregate liquid-asset portfolio A =(H;B) held by
the private sectors at a certain period  : Below are three policies that this modelling
covers.
Policy 1 (Change in Fiat Money Holding): The central bank changes the at-
money holding of a type x bank by Nx units, where Nx > 0 represents transfer
and Nx < 0 tax, at the beginning of period  . Then the aggregate change in the
quantity of at money is N :=
X
x=0;
fxNx and the policy is  = (N; 0).
Policy 2 (Open Market Operations): At the beginning of period  ; the central
bank announces that it will trade O units of the government bond at the market
price q on the liquid-asset market of the period, where O > 0 represents the
central bank buying and O < 0 selling. Hence,  = (qO; O) : Observe that the
bond price q will be a¤ected by the operation.
Policy 3 (Repo or Reverse Repo): At the beginning of period  ; the central bank
announces that it will lend (or borrow) at money at a policy rate p to any banks
who want to be the counterparty, using the government bond as the collateral,
on the interbank reserve market of the period. Suppose that as a result of the
policy, the central bank lends (or borrows) N units of at money. At the end
of the period the counterparty banks pay to (or receive from) the central bank
interest of Np units of at money in total. Hence,  = ( Np; 0) if we let N > 0
represents the central bank lending (i.e. repo) and N < 0 borrowing (i.e. reverse
repo).
We will show that monetary policy can produce real e¤ects in the steady state, in
which case, as suggested by Proposition <ref>Prop_Opp</ref>, the e¤ects can be
opposite to di¤erent types of banks.
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4 Non-Neutrality of Monetary Policy in the Steady
State
As shown in Proposition 3, the steady state can be in two regimes. One is the Never-
Binding Regime, in which  = (1   )= so that  = 0 and the liquidity constraint is
non-binding for any banks. The other is the Binding Regime, in which  < (1   )=
so that  > 0 and the liquidity constraint is binding for banks of type x > xL. We
begin with the Never-Binding Regime, which is easier to characterize.
In the Never-Binding Regime  = 0 for all x and  = (1  )=. Then the lending
rate of any type x is R(x; 0; (1 )=), independent of both the quantity of at money
H and that of the bond B. A marginal change to B a¤ects nothing, while that to H




fM(R(x; 0; (1  )=))dF (x) = H:
Hence the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If the steady state is in the Never-Binding Regime, then
(i) The Quantity Theory of Money holds: A marginal change in at moneys quantity
H a¤ects nothing but the the nominal price level p and d ln p=d lnH = 1.
(ii) The government bond is neutral too: A marginal change in its quantity B a¤ects
nothing.
As a result of the proposition, in the Never-Binding Regime, monetary policy pro-
duces no real results, unless it pushes the steady state out of the Never-Binding Regime
into the Binding Regime. A substantial change to (H;B)can cause this regime change.
To see this, we investigate under which conditions is the steady state in the Never-
Binding Regime. By Proposition 3, in the Never-Binding Regime, the real liquidity
position eV (x) of any type x satises:
eV (x)  max0; eS x; 0; 1  






Namely, the steady state is in the Never-Binding Regime if each type x can main-
tain such a real liquidity position eV (x) that its liquidity constraint is non-binding at
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interbank rate  = (1   )=: The aggregation of all the bankspositions, by equilib-
rium condition (34), is eH(1 + d=) = eH(1 + d=(1   )). We can specify a proleneV (x)o
x2[0;1]
that satises inequality (38) for any x, and hence the steady state is in
the Never-Binding Regime, if and only if the following condition holds:
eH 1 + d
1   







0; eS x; 0; 1  






quantity needed for no banks to face a binding liquidity constraint
:
(39)
Essentially, the inequality says the aggregate supply of liquid assets eH(1+d=(1 )) is
su¢ cient to meet the liquidity needs of all banks for them to face a nonbinding liquidity
constraint at  = (1   )=. As the real value of at money eH is a constant due to
the Quantity Theory of Money, the aggregate supply of liquid asset is proportional to
the bond-to-at money ratio . If  is large enough, the liquid assets abound. The
following proposition is hence intuitive





such that the steady state is in the
Never-Binding Regime if   c and it is in the Binding Regime if  < c.
The bond-to-at money ratio  characterizes the composition of the aggregate liquid
asset portfolio (H;B) = H (1; ). While we saw from Proposition 1 that for individual
banks the composition of their portfolios is indeterminate, Proposition 6 shows that the
composition  of the aggregate portfolio is a determinant of the property of the steady
state. Intuitively, for single banks, having more at money and less bond makes no
di¤erence as the two assets are a perfect substitute for one another. At the aggregate
level, in contrast, having a higher quantity H of at money and a lower quantity B
of the bond makes a substantial di¤erence for the value of the aggregate liquid-asset
portfolio in the steady state. The mechanism for that can be most cleanly explained
in the Never-Binding Regime, where the return rate of liquid assets  = (1   )= is
independent of H and B. In the steady state of this regime, a rise in H has no e¤ect on
the real value of at money, but lowers the unit real value p 1 of money proportionally.
As a result, the real value of dividend per unit of the bond, which is of a xed nominal
value d, decreases proportionally. So does the unit real value of the bond, given that the
discount factor applied to value it, determined by its return rate , is xed. Therefore,
a rise in H and fall in B decreases the real value of the aggregate liquid-asset portfolio
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in the steady state. Of course, in the Never-Binding Regime this decrease produces no
real e¤ect because there no banks face a binding liquidity constraint.
Things are completely di¤erent in the Binding Regime, which arises if < c. By
Proposition 3, in this regime, the real liquidity position of type x banks is given by
Equation (32). This equation substituted into equilibrium condition (36), we arrive at
the condition that pins down the steady state interbank rate  in the Binding Regime:Z 1
xH(;eI())











fM Rx; x; ; eI () ;  dF (x): (40)
It is obvious from this condition that the aggregate liquid-asset portfolio A = (H;B)
a¤ects the real allocation i.e. bankslending rates only via the impact of the bond-
to-at money ratio  = B=H on the interbank rate . Hence the following proposition
is self evident.
Proposition 7 A monetary policy  i.e. a change (H ;B) to the aggregate liquid-
asset portfolio A = (H;B) produces real e¤ects in the steady state if and only if it






and if and only if it moves the steady-state interbank interest rate .
Three implications immediately follow. First, any change in the quantity of at
money H alone produces real e¤ects in the steady state. In contrast, no real e¤ect is
produced if the aggregate liquid-asset portfolio changes from A to zA for any z > 0.
That is, at money is not neutral in the Binding Regime, but the aggregate liquid-asset
portfolio always is. Second, given that all the three policies listed preceding Section 4 
change to banksat money positions, open market operations, repo (or inverse repo)
satisfy Condition (41), they all produce real e¤ects in the steady state in the Binding
Regime. Third, together with Propositions 2 and 3, the follow corollary follows:
Corollary 1 If a monetary policy (H ;B) satises condition (41) and thus moves
the interbank rate , then it moves the lending rates of type x  xL banks in the opposite
direction to its moving the rates of type x  xH banks.
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Proof. By Proposition 2, the lending rates of liquidity unconstrained banks are
increasing with , those of the maximally constrained decreasing. By Proposition 3,
the former is banks of types x  xL, the latter of types x  xH .
To explain the mechanism in which a change in  moves , we rewrite Condition
(40) as followsZ 1
xH(;eI())




!e eH () ; (42)
where the real value of at money eH () = !eEx nfM Rx; x; ; eI () ; o (by
35) and b is the discount rate applied to evaluate the bond, which equals its return rate
. The left-hand side of (42) represents the aggregate demand of liquid assets (which
only banks of type x  xH hold), the right-hand side the aggregate supply, which now
we denote by eV. From this condition, we can see that via both direct and indirect
e¤ects does a change say a rise in  moves the interbank interest rate . The direct
e¤ect concerns the movement of  if
 eH; b; eI is xed. Given that
@ eS (x; (1  )=   ; ) =@ = x  fM 0(R)
<0
 @R (x; (1  )=   ; ) =@
<0
> 0;
the direct e¤ect of a rise in  is that  moves up. Intuitively, this e¤ect consists of
three links. First, given
 eH; b; eI, a rise in  increases the aggregate steady-state
value eV of liquid assets. This link has been explained in the discussion for Proposition
6. Second, the increase in eV, that is, the increased abundance of liquid assets, reduces
the maximal tightness  of the liquidity constraint. Third, as  = (1   )=    in
equilibrium, the interbank rate  rises. This is only a part of the full picture, however,
because this rise in  produces three indirect e¤ects by moving eH () ; b and eI ().
The rst two a¤ects the supply eV of liquid assets, the last the demand. Given the
discount rate b = , the rise in  reduces the bond price q = d=b for sure. However,
the direction of the movement in eH or eI is unclear. The reason lies in Propositions
2 and 3, by which the real lending scales fMx of types x  xL are decreasing with ,
those of types x  xH increasing. The relationship of  with eH () = !eEx nfMxo and
that with the interbank credit eI = Ex nxfMxo are thus unclear. As a result, although
we know @=@ 6= 0, the sign of it is unclear. Note, however, that the indirect e¤ects
are all driven by a change in , which occurs only because of the direct e¤ect in the
28
rst place. Hence, ultimately, it is by changing the aggregate value of liquid assets and
thereby relaxing or tightening banksliquidity constraint that a change in the bond-to-
at money ratio  moves the interbank rate , although the direction of the movement
is unclear so far.
Regarding this direction, however, the conventional argument has a clear prediction,
based on a consideration of demand-supply of bank reserves. That is, the argument
goes, an expansionary monetary policy, by increasing the supply H of bank reserves,
will decrease the cost  of borrowing it, while a contractionary policy, which decreases
the supply H, will increase . Given B, variable H moves in the opposite direction to
 = B=H. Therefore, the conventional argument predicts @=@ > 0. In the model
economy, while the sign of @=@ is unclear in the general case, as we explained above,
it is clearly determined in a special case where there are only two types of banks.
Specically we assume that the distribution of the outow fraction x is as follows:
x =
8<: 0 with probability f0 > 0 with probability f
9=; ;
and f0 + f = 1: Because xL > 0 by Lemma 3, type x = 0 is liquidity unconstrained.
Then type  must be maximally constrained in the Binding Regime. The steady state
is in the Binding Regime, by Proposition 6, if and only if  < c.
Proposition 8 In the two-type case, for any bond-to-at money ratio  2 (0; c] ; there
is a unique steady-state reserve borrowing rate  2 (0; (1  ) =]. The function  ()
satises: @=@ > 0;  (c) = (1  ) =; and lim!0  () = 0:
In this two-type case, therefore, the model makes the same prediction on the sign of
@=@ as the conventional argument. That is, in the Binding Regime, an expansionary
policy reduces the interbank interest rate , a contractionary policy raising it. However,
there are di¤erences in two dimensions.
First, the mechanism is di¤erent. The conventional argument focuses on at money
only, in particular its supply, whereas in this paper what matters is the composition
 of the aggregate liquid-asset portfolio; if and only if a monetary policy changes this
composition, it produces real e¤ects. Moreover, in the conventional argument banks
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liquidity constraint plays no role, whereas in this paper the real e¤ect is produced by
loosening or tightening this constraint.
Second, the prediction on the e¤ects for the real allocation is di¤erent. According
to Corollary 1, the e¤ects of non-neutral policy are heterogeneous, even opposite, for
banks with di¤erent outow fractions. In contrast, no such heterogeneity is to be found
in the conventional argument. The argument is concerned with the funding costs only.
Hence it predicts that bankslending rates should all decrease with an expansionary
policy and all increase with a contractionary one. Moreover, in this paper, the real
e¤ects that a non-neutral monetary policy produces occur in the steady state, whereas
by the conventional argument, they are only transitional.
5 Conclusion
This paper considers the non-neutrality of monetary policy incorporating three fun-
damental facts about money in modern economies. One, the major form of media of
exchange for real goods and services is bank liability rather than at money. Two, a
major use of at money is to meet banksliquidity needs. Three, banks extensively use
government bonds as the collateral for liquidity borrowing. We underline the impor-
tance for bank liquidity of the outow fraction, the fraction in which the money lent
out by a bank circulates into other banks: The greater the outow fraction, the heavier
the liquidity burden and the tighter the liquidity constraint.
In this paper, monetary policy is modelled as a change to the aggregate liquid-asset
portfolio, which consists of at money and a permanent government bond. The bond-
to-at money ratio determines the property of the steady state. If this ratio is above
a threshold, then in the steady state no banks are liquidity constrained and monetary
policy is neutral so long as it keeps the steady state within this Never-Binding Regime.
If the ratio is below the threshold, the liquidity constraint is binding for banks with
an outow fraction big enough. When the steady state is in this Binding Regime,
any monetary policy that changes the bond-to-at money ratio moves the interbank
interest rate, thereby moving bankslending rates. Ultimately, the mechanism is that
such a change alters the abundance that is, the real value of aggregate liquid assets,
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and hence tightens or relaxes banks liquidity constraint. Moreover, a non-neutral
monetary policy moves the lending rates of liquidity-unconstrained banks and those of
the maximal constrained in opposite directions. Lastly, we nd that if the advancement
of digital ways of payment eliminates random withdrawals completely, then at money
will stop circulation and a bullion standard will probably return.
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Proof of Lemma 1:
The rst order condition concerning the lending size M is as follows.
(M (R  1))0M   ( e;x + x) = 0: (43)
As M =M (R) ; we have dR
dM
= 1
M 0(R) : Then






It follows from (43) that
R  1   e;x   x = 0;
Which lead to the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Regarding the holding (ht+1; bt+1) of liquid assets, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and
the Envelop Theorem together command:
 (1 + + )  1  0;
ht+1 [ (1 + + )  1] = 0;
ht+1  0:






  q  0;
bt+1











To prove the lemma, we rst show that there exists one bank that nds it optimal to
hold both at money and the bond. Otherwise, there exists a bank with  = 1 nds it
optimal to hold cash but not the bond, and another bank with  = 2 nds it optimal
to hold the bond, but not cash. The rst order conditions for the 1-bank are
 (1 + + 1)  1 = 0;




















The rst order conditions for the 2 bank are
 (1 + + 2) < p;






  q = 0:
It follows from the equality that  (1 + + 2) = (1 + )
q
q+d
; substitute which into the




which contradicts with (44). Therefore, there exists a bank that nds it optimal to hold
both at money and the bond. Then the rst order conditions regarding (ht+1; bt+1)
for this bank are:
 (1 + + ) = 1












Proof of Lemma 2:
As eS = xfM (R) = [! (1  x) + x]fM (R), we have @ eS@x = (1  !)fM (R)+fM 0 (R) @R@x :
Because fM 0 < 0, @ eS
@x





< 0 ,   (1  !) (1  )R +  (+)(1 !e) (! !e)

< 0; which with
(21) ; is equivalent to
 [ (1  !e) +  (1  !)] < (1  !) (1  ) [1 +  e;x +  ],
 (1  !) +  (1  !e) < (1  !) (1  ) [1 +  e;x],
+ 
1  !e
1  ! < (1  ) [1 +  e;x],




1  !      (1  )  e;x

 < 1  ;
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which, as  >  e;x; follows from  (+ ) +

 1 !e
1 !    e;x

 < 1    ,  (+ ) +
! !e














< 1    , ! !e
1 ! <
( )






= fM 0 (R) @R
@







= fM 0 (R) @R
@
< 0 because fM 0 < 0 and @R
@
> 0: Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Because @ eS
@
< 0; we have eS (x; 0; )  eS  x; ;  :Hence, nxjeS  x; ;   (1  !) eYIo n
xjeS (x; 0; )  (1  !) eYIo : It follows that xH  xL: Moreover, if  > 0; the former
set is a true subset of the latter and hence xH > xL:
We are left to prove that Assumption (13) implies xL > 0: For this purpose, it
su¢ ce to show that S (0; 0; ) < (1  !)I : On the left hand side of this inequal-
ity S (0; 0; ) = !M (R) jR> 1






; while on the right hand side I =Z 1
0






































= E (x) 
1
1  ; namely,
condition assumed in (13). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions regarding the liquidity position V (x) of a type x bank






 (x) (V (x) + (1  !)I   S (x;  (x) ; )) = 0; (46)
(i) If x < xL; because @S=@ < 0; we have S (x; ; )  S (x; 0; )  (1  !)I for
any   0: Hence,  (x) = 0. We next prove that if x  xH ;  (x) = : By denition,




 (1  !)I : Suppose, if on the contrary,  (x) < :
Then the bank holds no liquid assets: V (x) = 0 by (45). Moreover, by Lemma 2,




: Then, we have S (x; ; ) > (1  !)I = (1  !)I + V (x) ;
that is, the liquidity constraint of the bank is violated, a contradiction. Therefore, if
x  xH ;  = : If  = 0; we have found  (x) for any x 2 [0; 1] :
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< (1  !)I (47)
S (x; 0; ) > (1  !)I : (48)
Then, two implications follows. First, inequality (47) commands that  (x) < ; oth-




= (1  !)I + V (x) 
(1  !)I , which, however, contradicts inequality (47). Second,  (x) > 0: Otherwise,
 (x) = 0 and by equation (45) the bank chooses V (x) = 0. But then by inequality
(48) S (x;  (x) ; ) = S (x; 0; ) > (1  !)I = (1  !)I+V (x) ; that is, the liquidity





Hence for the bank, the liquidity constraint is binding (i.e.  > 0) and it holds no liquid
assets (i.e.  < ): V (x) = 0: These two claims combined mean that
S (x;  (x) ; ) = I ;
as the proposition claims. By Lemma 2 @S
@x
> 0 and @S
@
< 0: The implicit function
theorem implies that @=@x > 0:
(ii) V (x) > 0 only if  (x) =  by equation (45), that is, only banks with  =  holds
liquid assets. By result (i),  (x) =  if and only if x  xH : With  > 0; the liquidity




= (1  !)I+V (x) :
Hence, the value of liquid assets hold by the type x satises




  (1  !)I :
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4:
For any t, by (7)  (e!; x) = hxt + bxt   e!Dxt: The aggregate supply of at
money Ex fhxtg = H; and by (5) Ex
nbxto = 0 because the net interbank credit
positions are cancelled out in aggregation. Moreover, the liquidity risk e! is independent
across banks and hence Ee!;x fe!Dxtg = !eEx fDxtg = !eEx fMxtg : Hence, altogether,
Ee!;x f (e!; x)g = H   !eEx fMxtg ; from which the lemma follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6:
38
We have seen only bank of type x > xH needs liquid assets to meet the liquidity
constraint; indeed by Denition 29, the "max" term on the right-hand side of 39 is
positive if and only if x > xH . Dene






eS x; 0; 1  


  (1  !) eI 1  


dF (x) : (49)
Then index Q measures the real surplus or decit of the liquid assets relative to
banks liquidity needs in the Never-Binding Regime. Condition 39 holds, and hence







[!e (1  x) + x]

1A 11  : (50)
We rst calculate Q: The real liquidity need of a type x bank in the never-binding



















xfMNB (x)i dF (x)  Z 1
xH
eSNB (x) dF (x) ; (51)
where xH > 0 is dened in Equation (29) and satises
eSNB  xH = (1  !)Z 1
0
xfMNB (x) dF (x) ; (52)
which pins down xH as a function of only exogenous variables. Obviously, Q linearly
increases with : To prove the proposition, it su¢ ces to prove that (a): Q < 0 at  = 0;
and (b): Q > 0 if   (1 )(1 !e)
d!e








For (a): LetG (t) := !e
Z 1
0
fMNB (x) dF (x)+[1  F (t)] (1  !)Z 1
0
h
xfMNB (x)i dF (x) Z 1
t





 G(0) and then that G (0) < 0: For the rst claim, observe that
G0(t) = f (t)
eSNB (t)  (1  !)Z 1
0
h
xfMNB (x)i dF (x) :
39
By (52) G0(xH) = 0:Moreover, because eSNB (t) increases with t by Lemma 2, G0(t)  0
for t < xH and G0(t)  0 for t > xH : Altogether, it follows that t = xH is the minimum




 G(0): For the second claim, that G (0) < 0, observe
that
G (0) = !e
Z 1
0
fMNB (x) dF (x) + (1  !)Z 1
0
h
xfMNB (x)i dF (x)  Z 1
0








(!e   !)fMNB (x) dF (x)
< 0:






fMNB (x) dF (x)   Z 1
0








  [! (1  x) + x]
i fMNB (x) dF (x) :Observe that g (x) := !e 1 + d1  
[! (1  x) + x] decreases with x: Hence g (x)  0 for x 2 [0; 1] if g (1)  0; that is, con-
dition (53) holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8:
First, we determin c: In the proof of Proposition 6, we show that the steady state is
in the binding regime if and only if Q < 0 where Q is dened in (49). In this two-type
















< (1  !)f0 + !: (54)
That is,  < c if and only (54) holds. Therefore, c is determined by equalization of
the two sides of (54).
In the binding regime, considering that  (0) = 0; we have  () =  = 1=   1  .
Hence, by (33), eYI = ffM (; 1=   1  ; ) :
The equilibrium condition (36) becomes:
f






hfM (0; 0; ) f0 + fM (; 1=   1  ; ) fi (55)
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Divide both sides by ffM (; 1=   1  ; ) ; use eS=fM =  by (??), and we arrive
the single following equation that determines :










fM (0; 0; )fM (; 1=   1  ; ) + 1
#
+ (1  !)f    = 0: (56)
Function fM (x; ; ) is given in equation (??). Use this equation and recall that  (0) =
0 and  () =  and  = 1=   1  ; and we nd:













Substitute these into (56) and use the fact that (1  !)f    =  !   (1  !)f0,





















375  !   (1  !)f0 = 0:
(58)
Let  (; ) denote the left hand side of (58). We show that  (; ) = 0 has a unique
























!e ()  !   (1  !)f0: (60)
Obviously,  () > 0 and 0 () < 0: It is straightforward to see that for any  > 0;










!e () < 0: (61)
Together, therefore,  () = 0 has a unique solution over  2 (0; (1  ) =) if and only
if  ((1  ) =; ) < 0; which is equivalent to condition (54), that is,  < c.
This calculation also shows that  ((1  ) =; c) = 0. Hence at  = c;  =






: By the denition of  () in
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> 0: We are left to prove that lim!0  () = 0:
By (60),  = 0,
 = 






Hence, lim!0  = 0 if
g () :=
! + (1  !)f0
!e ()
  1 > 0
for any  2 [0; (1  ) =] : Given 0 () < 0 and hence g0 () > 0; the condition holds
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, 1  ;
which certainly holds. Q.E.D.
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